Abstract: This analysis provides a re-appraisal of the 1899 Hague Conference by looking more closely at how citizen activists -notably in Britain but also transnationally -used it as a forum through which to press their agenda onto politicians and diplomatists. In so doing, this assembly existed as a stepping-stone between the 'old' diplomacy of the nineteenth century and the 'new' diplomacy of the twentieth. Peace activists identified and harnessed a growing body of progressive public opinion -on both a domestic and international scale -in the hope of compelling governments to take the necessary steps towards realising their ambitions of peace, disarmament, and international arbitration.
4 will be used here as a starting-point from which to re-assess the legacy of the first conference in 1899. This gathering marked a minor -but nonetheless significant -step on the path from the 'closed' diplomatic norms of the nineteenth century towards the more 'open' norms of the twentieth. As Hamilton and Langhorne note, 'new' diplomacy has two central tenets:
first, it is more open to public scrutiny and control; second, it finds basis on the establishment of international forums to facilitate the peaceful resolution of international disputes. 11 If the processes of international arbitration inaugurated at The Hague in 1899 tick the second box, then the impact of citizen activists, harnessing a latent public opinion behind their cause, arguably ticks the first.
The diplomatic climate of the late-nineteenth century appeared ill suited for a peace conference. It was a time of heightened nationalist tensions, imperial flashpoints, distinct power blocs, and the relentless growth of armaments. In spite of this international milieu, or perhaps because of it, the young Russian tsar, Nicholas II, issued a Rescript calling for a meeting of the Great Powers that would allow 'the great conception of universal peace to triumph over the elements of trouble and discord'. 12 This diplomatic gesture caught many seasoned diplomats off-guard but warmed the hearts of a burgeoning global movement inspired by ideals of peace, disarmament, and international arbitration. Described as a 'thunderclap', the tsar's initiative revived a movement disenchanted by the failure of AngloAmerican and Franco-American arbitration initiatives during the 1890s. 13 16 His argument that future wars would become so 'total' that no one side could ever emerge victorious, and that the costs of war -both human and financial -would become too high to contemplate, resonated with the tsar and aroused the hopes of peace activists across the world. One suggestion is that of all the hopes engendered by the 1899 conference, the disarmament question assumed the most importance in the eyes of global opinion. 17 Diplomatic circles, however, met the Tsar's proposals with a fusion of realism and cynicism, few believing that arms limitation was possible. As the British conservative 6
Unionist prime minister and foreign secretary, Lord Salisbury, remarked, 'it will be a very arduous task [to arrive at a formula which] would command the assent of all the European Powers'. 18 Elsewhere in Europe, the tsar's motives confronted cynicism. In Berlin, Kaiser
Wilhelm II dismissed the proposal as an attempt to reduce the 'heavy drain on the resources' of the Russian Empire that precluded St Petersburg from keeping pace, militarily, with the other Great Powers. 19 'I'll go along with the conference comedy', he remarked in an oftquoted aside, 'but I'll keep my dagger at my side during the waltz'. 20 The kaiser's cynical interpretation was widely shared in the foreign ministries and chancelleries of Europe, and this cynicism has done much to shape the dominant narrative of the 1899 Conference. To cynics, the tsar's initiative was motivated less by a deep-seated humanitarian impulse and more by a perceived need to redress the financial strains imposed on Russia by the arms race.
Although peace enthusiasts lapped up the Rescript, wizened and hard-nosed European diplomats probed the tsar's agenda, dismissed its utopian aspirations, and continued to arm regardless.
Nowhere is this diplomatic cynicism more evident than in the letters of Eyre Crowe, the emerging German expert in the British Foreign Office. Although better known for his pejorative commentary of the 1907 gathering -which he attended -Crowe was no less contemptuous when dismissing the prospects of the first. On hearing of the Rescript, he expressed astonishment that 'anybody should feel any excitement' about it and despaired at how 'the silly rubbish goes down the throat of H.M. Govt. like butter'. The following year, with the Conference underway, Crowe noted sardonically how it 'goes on pacifying its own members' whilst being ignored by everyone else. 21 But simply to dismiss the 1899
Conference as a talking-shop, full of platitudes and well-meaning rhetoric but short on substance, not only neglects the progress that was made, it disregards the growing influence of public opinion on diplomacy. Although Crowe could reject the Conference as a sideshow, of interest only to a handful of delegates and peace enthusiasts, the hopes it engendered captured the imagination of many. Furthermore, as was tacitly acknowledged in his earlier comments, these hopes began to permeate political and diplomatic circles. This was attributable, at least in part, to the tireless campaigning initiated by peace activists on a national and international scale.
In Britain, much credit for raising the public profile of the Conference belongs to
Stead. As Ceadel notes, his 'indomitable drive' lent the peace movement an impetus lacking since the death of Joseph Sturge in 1859, and Stead was eager to capitalise on the 'major opportunity' that had arisen courtesy of the tsar's intervention. 22 From the moment of the Rescript's issue, Stead sought to establish a 'pilgrimage of peace', first in Britain and subsequently further afield. In late-1898, he was discernibly upbeat about the progress that had been made, telling the Austrian pacifist, Bertha von Suttner, that the movement 'is becoming more and more serious everywhere' with the potential to enrol one million volunteers 'if the spirit and the enthusiasm with which we have started' could be sustained.
The groundswell of opinion mobilising behind the crusade convinced Stead that the means now existed to 'evoke the deep, heart felt aspirations of the masses of the nations, which have been silent too long'. 23 Indeed, he was confident that a well-informed and well-educated public opinion might compel reluctant governments in the direction of peace. 'Everything . .
.', he wrote to the veteran Liberal politician, James Bryce, in October 1898, 'hangs upon the degree and extent to which our people in England rally to the banner which the young Tsar has unfurled'. Mouravieff, stipulated the two overriding aims of the assembly: first, to arrest the growth of armaments and, potentially, even reduce them; and second, to implement an international mechanism capable of preventing recourse to war, most likely through arbitration. 30 Although Mouravieff gave primacy to disarmament, British officials felt that the best hopes for progress lay in arbitration.
The main explanation for the focus on arbitration was that Britain almost immediately rejected arms reduction as something to which it could not subscribe. The service departments were predictably keen to safeguard their existing levels of strength and, in a lengthy document within the official instructions given to the British delegates in 1899, the War Office went to extravagant lengths to question the desirability of reducing the nation's armaments. Britain, it argued, must be absolutely sure that the Hague discussions were not an elaborate ruse designed to reduce its naval capabilities so that other European Powers might form 'a coalition' capable of challenging its maritime supremacy. In addition, Britain's recent rearmament was deemed a necessary measure 'of precaution and prudence' in light of the 'action of other states'. 31 The War Office even demonstrated how increased armaments America. 34 One was an essay penned by Ducommun himself outlining the evolution of the peace movement to 1899, which noted the importance of 'winning over public opinion to ideas of concord and conciliation' as a means of compelling governments to resolve 'thorny issues' without recourse to war. This was achieved, stated Ducommun, courtesy of the 'dreamers'; their tireless work had ensured that public support for arbitration had grown year on year, to the extent that governments were now formally discussing the creation of a permanent court. 35 Another document included in the fascicle was an overview of the multifarious demonstrations held across Europe and America in favour of the tsar's ambitious proposals.
This report asserted that support was greater in Britain than elsewhere, the campaign engulfing the 'entire nation' thanks, in no small part, to Stead's tireless efforts. Even in 1716 assertion that secrecy is the 'life of negotiations'. 39 As a result, most delegates opposed any press intrusion into the conference's proceedings, viewing public opinion 'as a distraction from the work at hand'. 40 But whilst the official proceedings took place behind closed doors, a broader civil society emerged around it, meeting socially and even running parallel fora as the official sessions took place behind closed doors. 41 The secretary to the American delegation, Frederick Holls, welcomed the more 'open' forums for diplomatic dialogue:
[T]he importance of intimate and most attractive social intercourse between the delegates and the official society of The Hague should not be underestimated. Many a threatened misunderstanding was cleared away at some dinner table; many an 13 important point was agreed upon informally, but nonetheless effectively, at a hurried interview on a corner sofa during a crowded evening reception. 42 For others, however, it was an unwelcome distraction. Germany's first delegate, Count
Münster, repeatedly denounced the 'pack of rabble' -notably pacifists, socialists, women, and Jews -who continued to assemble unofficially with a view to promoting the core objectives of the Conference. 43 Stead also sought to circumvent the diplomats' proclivity for secrecy by tapping into his sources for frequent updates that he then published in his own newspaper, the Dagbladin English, French and Dutch -that subsequently informed press coverage throughout the world. C.P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian praised Stead's endeavour, stating that he 'must feel a parental satisfaction' over the good work achieved. Indeed, Scott considered the Conference to have been 'splendid right through', expressing surprise about so much accomplished. 'Personally', he wrote, 'I had no expectation of living to see anything so good in the line of international good-will'. 44 Scott's positive appraisal of the Conference was largely attributable to the fact that realistic goals vis-à-vis arbitration usurped the more ambitious aim of arresting armaments: the issue of disarmament was simply the subject of a 'platonic' resolution that invited governments to investigate the desirability of limiting arms spending. 45 But the realisation that something beneficial might be achieved with regard to arbitration greatly encouraged even those participants harbouring low expectations. The chief American delegate, Andrew Dickson White, was initially sceptical as to the possibility of positive outcomes: 'probably, since the world began, never has so large a body come together in a spirit of more hopeless scepticism as to any good result'. However, just two days later, 14 he was 'considerably encouraged', the prevailing pessimism 'passing away' as hopes for tangible results -particularly in the domain of arbitration -increased. 46 Arbitration would ultimately provide the most enduring outcome of the Conferencethe establishment of the Permanent Court of International Arbitration. As Ardagh remarked, despite failing to deliver the 'conclusions which the Utopian fanatics of the world believed to be inevitable', the conference had 'done much good' elsewhere. 47 This view echoed with the Russian delegate, Feodor de Martens, who concluded that whilst the Utopians -'the most dangerous enemies of international law' -will have been disappointed, the wisdom of 'practical statesmen' had prevailed by focusing only on the achievable. 48 Some scholars, in particular historians of international law who emphasise the significance of the arbitration scheme and the subsequent creation of the Permanent Court, share this contemporary appraisal. Frits Kalshoven notes that the 1899 Conference not only laid the foundations for the present-day International Court of Justice. It also implanted the idea 'that arsenals cannot be permitted unlimited growth both in a quantitative and qualitative sense', an idea that despite being unable to arrest the growth of armaments in the short-term 'would bearalways modest -fruit in the century that followed'. Kalshoven observes further that efforts to codify the rules of war marked 'an important step' towards the further progress witnessed in the latter-half of the twentieth-century. 49 Christopher Greenwood concurs. He argues that although the 'high hopes' entertained in 1899 were 'so cruelly and extensively disappointed'
by the destructive conflicts that followed in its wake, one must not overlook the 'achievements of the law-making process', which ensured that the 'laws of war at the end of the 20th century are far more advanced than they were at its outset'. Several official delegates shared these positive appraisals. Holls told von Suttner that his experiences at the conference had been more than a 'beautiful dream' as the entire occasion had assumed 'much more reality and practical value than a dream [amounting to] a great step forward'. 54 Even The Times acknowledged that the initial 'diplomatic stiffness' and mutual distrust had given way to a genuine belief that 'more fruitful developments' were possible. 55 Stead also dwelt on the positives, applauding the Conference for cultivating a 'good esprit de corps and a frank friendly fraternity of feeling'. He also welcomed Pauncefote's arbitration scheme, commenting how something previously dismissed as In the crusade of last winter we were hindered by political and national prejudices against the Russia autocracy, and thousands of people in Europe, including the great Socialist Party in France and Germany, refused to lift a finger in aid of a movement which had otherwise their cordial sympathy. After to-day, we have no need to base our appeal on the Russian proposals alone. The aspiration after an arrest of armaments has received the formal benediction of the representatives of all the Powers; and it is in the name of the Conference that we will resume our work, and with a new confidence of victory. 57 To mobilise public opinion behind further international agreement, a 'vigorous' propaganda was needed: the 'Governments have made the machine, but it is now for the peoples to see that the machine is made use of'. 58 Perris concurred, noting that 'monarchs and statesmen' would only use the machinery created at The Hague if so persuaded by 'a popular public demand'. To generate a sufficient demand, it was imperative that the peace societies continue 'their task of agitation and education'. 59 Stead, Perris, and like-minded individuals were convinced that 'popular sentiment' could bend intransigent statesmen around to their will.
For Evans Darby, the 1899 gathering 'furnished a new illustration of the power of public opinion' during which the 'force and influence of public sentiment' was apparent to all in attendance. 60 The Hague Conference was the latest example of an emergent 'body of international law' that relied solely on the 'moral sanction' of public opinion. The arrangements made, despite lacking compulsion, were 'more largely recognised as the judgment and conscience of mankind, to which no nation can persistently defy and maintain its standing in the family of nations'. 61 The International Peace Bureau also celebrated the constructive outcomes achieved at
The Hague. The 1900 Universal Peace Congress in Paris expressed satisfaction at the 'positive steps' that had been taken in the direction of international law but regretted its failure to make arbitration obligatory. Overall, however, the positives outweighed the failures, to the extent that the Congress even suggested that the old adage -'Si vis pacem para bellum' -had been disproved, not only by the efforts of the peace activists but also by those statesmen and politicians, notably the tsar, who had come to recognise the 'ruinous results' of war. 62 That such a conference convened at all was interpreted as evidence of public opinion's growing influence on diplomatic procedure. Passy told the conference that governments would eventually have to succumb to the 'pressure of public opinion', a view echoed by d'Estournelles de Constant at the 1901 Congress in Budapest: 'Today it is not the government that leads opinion; it is opinion that leads the government'. In the face of a hostile public, he asserted, no government could now wage an unjust war. 63 It is apparent that one of the outcomes of the 1899 Conference was optimism that it would be a precursor of future assemblies and, above all, of a more peaceful century ahead.
As Pauncefote articulated so eloquently in his final report to London, this unprecedented meeting of the 'great family of nations' would ensure that the 'new century will open with brighter prospects of peace'. 64 For White, the 'mere assembling of such a body for such a purpose' was a substantial step forward, a gain surpassed only by the 'the positive outcome of its labors'; Stead asserted that 'the Conference itself is its own sufficient justification . . . the beginning of the organisation of the world-unit'. 65 To build upon this 'first step', d'Estournelles de Constant told Stead, the public must ensure that their governments 'don't stop half way'. 66 Though rather disillusioned, Green remained sanguine that the jingoist wave 'will pass away as it did before', and that British peace advocates must meanwhile stay true to 'the spirit of the great saying -Magna est veritas, et praevalebit'. 69 Stead also found the situation prompted by the Transvaal war intensely frustrating, and he campaigned from its beginning against British policy there. The unwillingness of the rest of the British peace movementnotably the Peace Society -to condemn British actions in the Cape frustrated him. 70 'privileged' within the pro-Boer campaign, rarely targets of violence, and clearly immune to the stigma of emasculation attached to their male counterparts. 73 Consequently, female activists were pivotal in forcing the British public to re-evaluate the righteousness of their crusade in the Cape, especially after Emily Hobhouse's revelations concerning British atrocities against Boer women and children. 74 As unease with the war spread in Britain, Stead sensed an opportunity to re-invigorate the processes of international law established in 1899.
He was convinced that 'the public opinion of the world' would agree that 'a stronger Power'
had no right to eliminate a smaller one having refused the latter's appeal for arbitration.
Despite acknowledging that support for such a campaign would struggle to gain traction in Britain, Stead told Ducommun that 'this is the psychological moment for the International Union to take its first public act, and to make itself the organ of the conscience of mankind'.
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The International Peace Bureau had not been entirely inactive, making various representations to the British and neutral governments in the hope of securing 'good offices'
for the mediation of the conflict. It had also issued circulars and appeals to constituent members around the globe. 76 At the same time, the Bureau's annual congresses persistently forwarded proposals aimed at advancing the cause of arbitration and international law, apparently undeterred by the failure of prevailing mechanisms to resolve existing conflicts.
Indeed, two years after war in the Transvaal ended, the Russo-Japanese War began, another conflict seemingly impervious to peaceful resolution. Simultaneously, the European Powers moved inexorably into ever more ominous blocs whilst continuing to rearm at a frightening pace. 77 The portents for any embellishment of the 1899 advances were far from promising. pleasure from co-operating with Washington 'in so important a matter'. 80 As the date of the next conference approached, there appeared to be even more reason for optimism, especially from the perspective of British peace activists. The Liberals' landslide election victory in early 1906 on a ticket of 'peace, retrenchment and reform' was a huge fillip for those harbouring hopes of major advances not only in arbitration but also in disarmament. After the disaster that befell the movement with the outbreak of the Boer War, this election appeared to 22 mark a partial revival of the 'reputation of the public'. 81 Once again, an enlightened and progressive public opinion came to the fore, compelling the new Liberal administration to take very seriously the hopes that were entertained ahead of the 1907 gathering.
It is beyond the scope of this analysis to assess the proceedings and outcomes of the 1907 Conference, but it is apparent that the accomplishments of 1899 were both a help and a hindrance. On the one hand, it established a precedent, laying foundations that future conferences could build upon with the support of a vibrant and vigorous peace movement.
On the other, the hopes generated by the 1899 meeting led to even more far-reaching aspirations in 1907, particularly regarding disarmament. At the same time, despite the genuinely positive outcomes of 1899 -notably the establishment of the Arbitration Treatyit clearly failed to prevent conflict or arrest the growth of armaments. In fact, international tensions increased between 1899 and 1907, greatly diminishing the prospects for arbitration and disarmament. 82 But the disappointment that would accompany the lack of progress in 1907 was not simply attributable to the deteriorating international situation. In part, it resulted from the heightened optimism that had resulted from the 1899 Conference.
There is no doubt that the hopes aroused by the tsar's Rescript had been sizeable, particularly within the emergent peace movement. As de Martens noted in the immediate aftermath, no prior conference had 'aroused so many hopes and so much opposition as the Conference at The Hague'. 83 It is also true that opposition was most prevalent in political and diplomatic spheres hence the almost immediate rejection of disarmament in favour of making gains in the domain of international arbitration. But two points need to be borne in mind here: first, most peace activists in Britain, despite some lofty rhetoric, shared the diplomats'
view that disarmament was impracticable so instead focused on arbitration; second, the genuine progress that was made with regard to arbitration meant that much of the initial political and diplomatic cynicism soon dissipated. Nobody suggested that war had become obsolete -the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War illustrated this all too clearly -but there were reasons to believe that the first step had occurred and that future assemblies could build upon the foundations laid. It also explains why the aims of peace activists ahead of the 1907 Conference outran what was practicable or likely.
Above all the 1899 Conference demonstrated the reach of peace activists, not only influencing governments but also reaching out to educate public opinion on issues of war and peace. This reach would grow further as the 'new' diplomacy that was emerging by 1899 meant that diplomats would struggle to exclude the press and public from their deliberations as they had tried to do -not entirely successfully -at the first Hague Conference. 84 Indeed, there was a tangible sense amongst those in attendance in 1899 that times were already beginning to change, and that citizen activists could exert an influence; in May 1899, it was noted in Punch, albeit sardonically, that 'The Tsar of All the Russians plays second fiddle, whilst [Stead] leads the orchestra'. 85 Diplomats also began to acknowledge this transition. de of British public opinion certainly encouraged the Liberal government to urge a serious discussion of arms limitation at that meeting. That these discussions came to nought, and that the wider efforts of international peace activists failed to provide the necessary antidote to the
